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Abstract
This project focuses on explaining why the aggressive lending in the sub-prime mar-
ket is a rational behavior of the sub-prime lenders in a qualitative and quantitative
way. Through comparing the differences between a traditional mortgage market and
the sub-prime market with the involvement of securitization, we can observe that the
borrowers bargaining power has changed accordingly. Securitization has prevented
borrowers from behaving strategically when serving the debt. Through modeling, we
are able to numerically show that when the borrower has limited options to strategi-
cally serve the debt, the lender will respond by extending more credit over per dollar of
collateral. This is exactly what the banks were doing when making sub-prime loans
to potential homeowners. Based on the game theoretical partial differential equa-
tion model, our numerical results suggest that aggressive lending is not a predatory
behavior, rather, it is a rational movement of the sub-prime lenders.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent boom-to-bust housing crisis has caused great turbulence in the U.S. econ-
omy. People who intend to discover the origin of this plague often find many factors to
blame. Demyanyk and Hemert (2008) were able to show that unsustainable growth
is the reason why the housing market collapsed. Ashcraf and Schuermann (2008)
believe that securitization of mortgage backed securities (MBS) is subject to seven
fractions that all contributed to the melt down. As people search through the rea-
sons, inevitably, the core of the causes falls onto the aggressive lending behavior of
sub-prime lenders. Recent literatures have tried to study this behavior and aimed to
find out why banks are so aggressive when they originate loans.
Many researchers found that the securitization process in the sub-prime market
led to predatory lending. Pavlov and Wachter (2006) are able to observe that ag-
gressive lending exercises magnifies the housing price cycle. That is, in regions where
aggressive lending is more concentrated, real estate market suffers a bigger volatility
than in regions with less concentrated aggressive lending practices. Mian and Sufi
(2008) built on this observation and proved that mortgage credit expansion led by
aggressive lending was a major contributor to the housing price appreciation in early
2000. The reason is that when lenders ease the lending standards, they can attract
more potential homeowners. As a result, the demand for housing will increase which
will drive real estate prices up. Although relaxed lending standards can increase de-
fault risk by allowing borrowers with poor credit scores to serve the mortgage, rising
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
house prices can always help reduce this threat. For example, when mortgagors are
facing difficulties in making their payments when the teaser-rate period is over, since
their collateral has increased in value, they can always re-negotiate their contracts
with the lenders and obtain a more favorable rate. This cycle was self feeding until
interest rate started to gradually increase, as sub-prime mortgage borrowers started
to face unaffordable adjustable monthly payments, the market started the melt down.
Therefore, Mian and Sufi (2008) believe that the aggressive lending behavior to be
moral hazard on behalf of the originators.
However, by applying valuation techniques based on strategic debt service liter-
atures, we are able to find evidences that suggest aggressive lending is a strategic
practice on the lender side instead of a moral hazard behavior. Jones (1995) exam-
ines rational behavior in a benchmark complete market environment market for se-
cured loans under conditions of symmetric information and no moral hazard. Taking
into account the bankruptcy fact, Theunissen (1998) utilizes a similar game theo-
retic framework based on standard model of contingent claims valuation approaches
similar to Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and examines the rational opportunistic
behaviors of the contracting parties for the extension of credit by banks. Comparing
Jones and Theunissens results, we can obtain a very important property, that is, the
amount of money the lender is willing to lend depends on the strategic behavior of
the borrower; the lender will extend less credit for a given market value of collateral
if borrowers can serve the debt strategically. Thus, to answer the question of whether
aggressive lending is rational or not, we need to compare the traditional market with
the sub-prime market to see if the borrowers’ bargaining power has changed.
Chapter 2
The Mortgage Market
2.1 Lending in the Traditional Mortgage Market
2.1.1 Traditional Mortgage Market Structure
One character of sub-prime lending is that lenders are willing to grant more credit to
borrowers at any given interest rate level. Before the invention of securitization, home
financing involves two major parties - the mortgagor (borrower) and the mortgagee
(lender). The mortgagee is typically either a bank or a savings institution who makes
the decision to grant a loan to the mortgagor to fund the purchase of his home. In
return, the mortgagor makes monthly payments that include interest and principle to
the mortgagee until the loan is paid off. Through the life of the mortgage contract,
the mortgagee remains as the owner of the loan and performs administration tasks
such as collecting payments and managing delinquencies. This setting is what we
refer to as the traditional mortgage market.
2.1.2 The Borrower-Lender Relationship
Figure 2.1 shows that in a traditional mortgage market, the lender advances credits to
the borrower and the borrower makes streams of payments back to the lender over the
life of the loan. In the event of borrower default, the lender liquidates the collateral
3
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Figure 2.1: Borrowing in the Traditional Market
in oder to recover the losses. However, because they are the only parties involved,
lender and borrower can often avoid foreclosure by negotiation and come up with
various alternatives that maximize their relative long-term benefits. For example,
if the borrower is having difficulties making scheduled payments, he can work with
the lender to seek options to re-structure the loan to help release his pressure on
servicing the debt; through evaluation of the alternatives, if the lender decides that
re-structuring the loan is the best option that can maximize the contract value in
the long run, he is likely to choose to make compromises in pursuit of the long-term
benefits.
The possibility of ongoing negotiation also allows the borrowers to act strategically
when serving the debt. If the borrower makes less than the contractual payments at
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a given time, it is considered as default. This grant the lender the right to foreclose.
By exercising this foreclosure option, the lender will incur various costs such as legal
and liquidation costs. So after foreclosure, the lender has to use the proceeds from
liquidating the collateral to cover both the owed amount plus all the costs, and then
refunds the rest (if any) to the borrower. If the borrower is aware of how much it will
cost the lender to foreclose, he might be able to find a critical value although lower than
the contractual payment, but not low enough for the lender to terminate the contract.
Through ongoing negotiation, the borrower is able to convince the lender that it is
optimal to continue the contract with a lower monthly payment than to terminate it
because of the existence of the foreclosure costs. As strategic debt service literatures
suggest, the possibilities that the borrower might behave strategically will affect how
the lender perceive the worth of the contract. Therefore, in the traditional market,
because borrowers can freely exercise strategic options due ongoing negotiation, the
lender either has to require a higher yield, or extend less credit for a dollar of collateral
in order to be compensated.
2.2 Lending in Sub-prime market with Securitiza-
tion
Securitization has completely changed the lending and borrowing structure of the
home financing market. It created a funding mechanism that separated different roles
that the lender played previously in the traditional market. This decentralization
structure helps to increase credit availability to a great extend. On the other hand, it
increased the complexity of the home financing mechanism by including more parties
into the system.
As it is shown in Figure 2.2, Under the securitization frame work, the lender no
longer maintains ownership of the mortgage through out the life of the loan. Instead,
he is only responsible for originating loans then sell them as packages to a new owner
- the issuer, which is a bankruptcy-remote special purpose entity (SPE) that issues
securities to individual investors. Once the mortgage is sold to the issuer, the lender
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can no longer restructure the loan or renegotiate with the borrower. Instead, the
trustee that representing the interest of the investors will hire a servicer to collect
payments and manage administrative tasks such as handling delinquencies and fore-
closures. However, in terms of negotiating the loan contracts, the servicer has a lot
less flexibility than traditional lenders. Because the servicer has to protect the interest
of the investors, it can only do what the securitization documents permit. The doc-
uments provide rules for how mortgages should be serviced through the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement (PSA). For example, the PSA specifies how many delinquencies
the servicer can tolerate with each contract before foreclosure and the action of the
servicer has to be in compliance the agreement.
Thus, the complexity of the securitization structure makes it vary difficult for the
borrower to follow a credit workout strategy. As previously mentioned, in the tradition
mortgage market, the borrower can find ways to deviate from the mortgage contract
but never triggers foreclosure. However, with the involvement of securitization, he
could no longer practice that strategy again. The servicer will have to follow the PSA
and force it into foreclosure. Although considering the cost of foreclosure it might
not be the best option for the servicer to terminate the mortgage contract, servicer
simply has to follow the rules instead of keep negotiating with the borrower.
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Figure 2.2: Borrowing in the Sub-Prime Market with Securitization
Chapter 3
The Game and The Model
In the previous chapter, we can observe that securitization has eliminated the borrow-
ers option to service the mortgage strategically compare to borrowing in a traditional
market. When the lender originate the loan to sub-prime borrowers, he must keep
this in mind and extend credit accordingly. To prove this, we apply the strategic debt
service frame works developed by Jones (1995) and Theunissen (1998).
We implement the same conditions used by Jones (1995) where the continuous
time valuation is arbitrage free and risk-free interest rate is set to be constant to help
keep our modeling simple. Also, we assume that the housing price s(t) is independent
and follows a standard brownian motion with a diffusion
ds(t) = α(s, t)dt+ σs(t)dW (t) (3.1)
The debt contract we consider here is a simply multiperiod, specified collateral,
non-recourse loan contract similar to the ones described in Jones (1995) and Theunis-
sen (1998). In a finite time interval, [0, T ], the lender offers an initial sum of $1 to
the borrower at t = 0. In exchange the borrower will make continuous payments at
a rate of p per year over the interval [0, T ], with a lump-sum payment, P , at t = T .
Therefore, the contractual loan rate, y, satisfies
1 = p
∫ t
0
e−yτdτ + b(t)e−yt (3.2)
8
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where b(t) represents the outstanding loan balance at t ∈ [0, T ]. Simplifying the
integral term in Eq. (3.2) gives
b(t) = eyt − (eyt − 1)p/y (3.3)
THe lump-sum payment P then is:
P = b(T ) = eyT − (eyT − 1)p/y (3.4)
The mortgage contract is assumed to be in a complete market, where the lender
and borrower are in a perfect symmetric information environment. For example, both
parties are assumed to have the same information about the current collateral price
but not the price in the next moment; also, both have perfect knowledge of the cost
of foreclosure, delinquency and prepayment.
3.1 Game in the Traditional Market
First, we model the situation in a traditional market and aim to calculate how much
credit the lender is willing to extend for every dollar of collateral when the borrower
can behave strategically. This is referred to as the strategic game by Theunissen
(1998), which the borrower attempt to deviate from the agreement whenever it is in
his best interest to do so. The traditional market setting has allowed both the borrower
and lender to achieve the equilibrium of the game by playing it non-cooperatively. At
every point of time the borrower decides to pay the lender an instantaneous debt
service flow of p∗ by fully being aware of what the lenders rational response will be.
The lender will react in a way to maximize the value of his clam of the contract. The
continuation value of the claims for the lender can be expressed as:
L(s, t) = p∗[s(t), t]dt+ L−(s, t) (3.5)
And the continuation value of the claims for the borrower is:
B(s, t) = [d(s, t)− p∗[s(t), t]]dt+B−(s, t) (3.6)
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where L−(s, t) = EQt [L(s+ ds, t+ dt)]e−rdt and B−(s, t) = E
Q
t [B(s+ ds, t+ dt)]e
−rdt
representing the ’ex debt service’ and ’ex dividend’ values of the claims, respectively.
We also assume that L(s, t) and B(s, t) satisfy the following partial differential
equations (Theunissen (1998)):
1
2
σ2s2Lss + [rs− d(s, t)]Ls + Lt + p∗[s(t), t] = rL (3.7)
1
2
σ2s2Bss + [rs− d(s, t)]Bs +Bt + d(s, t)− p∗[s(t), t] = rB (3.8)
where r is the risk-free interest rate and d(s, t) is the service flow or dividend stream
over the multiperiod term of the loan contract generated by the collateral.
3.1.1 Borrowers strategic options
Follow the contract (p∗ = p): the borrower can service the debt by making the
contractual payments at every time t .
Terminating default (p∗ = 0): at any time t ! T during the life of the loan
contract, the borrower can choose to stop serving the debt which will force the lender
to foreclose. The lender then liquidates the collateral to cover the remaining balance
b(t) and any costs incurred l(s, t) before refunding the remaining (if any) to the
borrower.
Prepayment: at any time t < T during the life of the loan contract, the borrower
can choose to prepay the remaining amount of the loan b(t), which will also terminate
the contract. If borrower choose to prepay, the lender gets the remaining balance and
the borrower obtain the collateral and incur refinancing cost f [b(t)].
Strategic default: for any given time interval during the game, because the borrower
fully acknowledges the lenders cost of foreclosure l(s, t), he can obtain a number pˆ
that although might be lower than the contractual amount, but leaves the lender
indifferent between allowing the continuation of the loan or foreclosure. This is made
possible by the traditional borrower - lender relationship where ongoing negotiation is
allowed. Therefore, although the borrower deviates from the contract by only making
a partial payment, it forces a rational lender to continue accepting this payment pˆ
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and not choose to foreclose. At maturity time T the borrowers offers the smallest
payment, P ∗, which does not provoke foreclosure
P ∗ = min{P,max 0, s(T )− l(s, T )} (3.9)
and the values of the claims at maturity are then given by{
L(s, T ) = P ∗
B(s, T ) = s(T )− L(s, T ) = max{l(s, T ), s(T )− P} (3.10)
where P = b(T ).
For t < T , there exits a critical instantaneous debt service flow pˆ which leaves the
lender indifferent between foreclosing and continuing the loan, where pˆ satisfies:
pˆ[s(t), t]dt = max{0,ΩL(s, t)− L−(s, t)} (3.11)
and ΩL(s, t) is the value of the lenders clam when pursuing foreclosure:
ΩL(s, t) = min
{
b(t),max{0, s(t)− l(s, t)}
}
(3.12)
The borrowers optimal service offer for the next time interval dt is:
p∗[s(t), t]dt = min{pdt, pˆdt} (3.13)
3.2 Game Under Securitization Structure
Securitization has prohibited the borrower from serving the debt strategically. As
it is described previously, the servicer is under strict rules and will not be able to
allow borrowers to delinquent. Therefore, the game has become a terminating game
(Theunissen, 1998).
Default of the borrower: at any time t ! T , if the borrower pays less than the full
contractual amount p, the contract will be terminated. Note that the borrower can
no longer pay a smaller pˆ and still keep the contract alive because the collector will
not negotiate with him. Thus,
p∗[s(t), t] =
{
0 for (s, t) ∈ D
p for (s, t) /∈ D (3.14)
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In the default region D{
ΩL(s, t) = max{0, s(T )− l(s, T )}
ΩB(s, t) = 0
(3.15)
Prepayment: the borrower can still choose to prepay the loan when it is in his best
interest to do so. In the prepay region P{
ΩL(s, t) = b(t)
ΩB(s, t) = s(t)−min{l(s, t), f [b(t)]}− b(t)
(3.16)
The continuation region C can then be defined by s(t) < s(t) < s¯(t).
On the boundary of the lower default region, s(t), the value matching condition for
the borrower’s optimal stopping game implies that B(s(t), t) = ΩB(s(t), t), i.e.,
[d(s, t)− p]dt+B−(s, t) = 0 (3.17)
On the boundary of the upper prepay region, s¯(t), value matching condition can be
expressed as
[d(s¯− p]dt+B−(s¯, t) = s¯(t)−min{l(s¯, t), f [b(t)]− b(t)} (3.18)
In terms of boundary conditions at time t = T , we have
P ∗ =
{
0 for s(T ) ! P
P for s(T ) > P
(3.19)
The boundary conditions for the lender and borrower are respectively given by
L(s, T ) =
{
max{0, s(T )− l(s, T )} for s(T ) ! P
P for s(T ) > P
(3.20)
and
B(s, T ) =
{
0 for s(T ) ! P
s(T )− P for s(T ) > P (3.21)
Both the borrower and lenders options remain the same as in the traditional
market with one exception - the borrower can no longer practice strategic default. The
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elimination of the borrowers strategic default option has changed the game completely
from a strategic game to a terminating game. Under securitization structure, at any
instantaneous moment, the borrower has to choose either to continue on serving the
debt by paying the contractual amount p, or to terminate the contract by making no
payment. The lender responds to the borrowers action by either allowing the contract
to be served or foreclose. The valuation of the lenders clam is shown in the next
chapter .
Chapter 4
Numerical Results
In this chapter we investigate and compare the numerical results for both terminating
and strategic games described in the previous chapter for different values of loan
contract parameters. Starting from maturity T and working backwards in time, the
partial differential equations (PDEs) are solved using Crank-Nicolson methods with
corresponding boundary conditions in the discretized state space (s, t). At each time
step, we check whether it is optimal for both parties to exercise the options available
to them for each level of s by comparing the values obtained from the PDEs with the
values when options are exercised. The critical levels of s(t) for each time step t form
the termination boundaries, therefore we could identify whether each point (s, t) is in
the termination regions.
We focus on two things. First, we explore the impact of different values of loan
contract parameters on loan to value ratio (LTV), L(s(0), 0)/s(0) for both terminating
default games (securitization) and strategic default games (non-securitization) cases.
Second, we will numerically show that LTV is greater when the borrower cannot
behave strategically compared to when he can for different values of loan parameters.
For simplicity, in the numerical illustrations we assume that the dividend flows, d(s, t),
and the liquidation costs, l(s, t), are linear functions of the prevailing fair market value
of the collateral, s(t), i.e., d(s, t) = d0+d1s(t) and l(s, t) = l0+l1s(t). Also, we assume
that the refinancing costs is linear in b(t) with f [b(t)] = f0 + f1b(t). In the following
numerical simulations, we assume that the risk-free interest rate r = 0.05 per year;
14
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annualized proportional volatility of the value of the house collateralizing the mortgage
is σ = 0.2; the term to maturity of the mortgage is T = 5; no payments are due before
maturity, so that p = 0; the credit spread c = y − r = 0.03 per year; no refinancing
cost, so that f0 = f1 = 0; no dividend flow, so that d0 = d1 = 0; liquidation cost
parameters l0 = 0 and l1 = 0.1; initial value of house s(0) = 1.1. Results are presented
based on the above values of parameters, unless otherwise indicated. The MATLAB
codes are in appendix.
Fig. 4.1 to Fig. 4.5 show the effects of the loan parameters for L(s(0),0)s(0) and
the differences between two strategic and terminating games. Fig. 4.1 shows the
impact of the dividend flow parameter d1 on the loan to value ratio
L(s(0),0)
s(0) for both
terminating default and strategic default games. Fig. 4.2 shows the impact of the
liquidation cost parameter l1 on the loan to value ratio,
L(s(0),0)
s(0) , for both terminating
default and strategic default games. An increase in the liquidation cost reduces the
willingness of lender to lend and has stronger impact on the strategic default game
than terminating default game, where L(s(0),0)s(0) decreases to 0 as l1 goes to 1. Fig. 4.3
shows the impact of the term to maturity parameter T on the loan to value ratio,
L(s(0),0)
s(0) , for both terminating default and strategic default games. An increase in T
reduces the willingness of lender to lend for both cases. Fig. 4.4 shows the impact
of the volatility parameter σ on the loan to value ratio L(s(0),0)s(0) for both terminating
default and strategic default games, where the bigger the volatility of value of the
collateral, the less willingness of the lender to lend. Fig. 4.5 shows the impact of
the risk-free interest rate r on the loan to value ratio, L(s(0),0)s(0) , for both terminating
default and strategic default games, where we can see that the level of the risk-free
interest rate does not affect the willingness of lender to lend again given collateral.
The lower figures show the difference between the cases, which indicates that the
lender is willing to lend more when borrower can not behave strategically compared
to when he can.
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Figure 4.1: The upper figure shows the impact of the dividend flow parameter d1
on the loan to value ratio L(s(0),0)s(0) for both terminating default and strategic default
games. The lower figure shows the difference between the cases, which indicates
that the lender is willing to lend more when borrower can not behave strategically
compared to when he can.
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Figure 4.2: The upper figure shows the impact of the liquidation cost parameter l1
on the loan to value ratio, L(s(0),0)s(0) , for both terminating default and strategic default
games. An increase in the liquidation cost reduces the willingness of lender to lend
and has stronger impact on the strategic default game than terminating default game,
where L(s(0),0)s(0) decreases to 0 as l1 goes to 1. The lower figure shows the difference
between the cases, which shows that the lender is willing to lend more when borrower
can not behave strategically compared to when he can.
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Figure 4.3: The upper figure shows the impact of the term to maturity parameter T
on the loan to value ratio, L(s(0),0)s(0) , for both terminating default and strategic default
games. An increase in T reduces the willingness of lender to lend for both cases. The
lower figure shows the difference between the cases, which shows that the lender is
willing to lend more when borrower can not behave strategically compared to when
he can.
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Figure 4.4: The upper figure shows the impact of the volatility parameter σ on the
loan to value ratio L(s(0),0)s(0) for both terminating default and strategic default games.
The lower figure shows the difference between the cases, which shows that the lender
is willing to lend more when borrower can not behave strategically compared to when
he can.
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Figure 4.5: The upper figure shows the impact of the risk-free interest rate r on
the loan to value ratio, L(s(0),0)s(0) , for both terminating default and strategic default
games. Changes in risk-free do not affect the willingness of lender to lend again
given collateral.The lower figure shows the difference between the cases, which shows
that the lender is willing to lend more when borrower can not behave strategically
compared to when he can.
CHAPTER 4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 21
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
 t
 s
 Prepay Region and Default Region
Default Boundary
Prepay Boundary
Figure 4.6: Prepay and Default Boundaries
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                      Strategic Default         Terminating Default
d_1 P L(s,0) L/s(0) L(s,0) L/s(0)
0.00 1.4918 0.874 0.795 0.880 0.800
0.02 1.4918 0.818 0.743 0.823 0.748
0.04 1.4918 0.760 0.691 0.764 0.695
0.06 1.4918 0.702 0.638 0.705 0.641
0.08 1.4918 0.644 0.586 0.647 0.588
0.10 1.4918 0.589 0.536 0.591 0.538
0.12 1.4918 0.537 0.488 0.538 0.490
0.14 1.4918 0.488 0.444 0.489 0.445
l_1 P L(s,0) L/s(0) L(s,0) L/s(0)
0.1 1.4918 0.863 0.785 0.880 0.800
0.2 1.4918 0.802 0.729 0.831 0.755
0.3 1.4918 0.727 0.661 0.781 0.710
0.4 1.4918 0.641 0.582 0.732 0.665
0.5 1.4918 0.543 0.494 0.682 0.620
0.6 1.4918 0.439 0.399 0.633 0.575
0.7 1.4918 0.332 0.302 0.583 0.530
0.8 1.4918 0.225 0.204 0.534 0.485
0.9 1.4918 0.118 0.107 0.484 0.440
1 1.4918 0.011 0.010 0.435 0.395
T P L(s,0) L/s(0) L(s,0) L/s(0)
1 1.4918 0.929 0.844 0.941 0.855
2 1.4918 0.907 0.825 0.915 0.832
3 1.4918 0.893 0.812 0.899 0.817
4 1.4918 0.882 0.802 0.888 0.807
5 1.4918 0.874 0.795 0.880 0.800
6 1.4918 0.867 0.788 0.871 0.791
7 1.4918 0.861 0.783 0.863 0.785
8 1.4918 0.855 0.778 0.859 0.780
9 1.4918 0.850 0.773 0.850 0.773
10 1.4918 0.845 0.768 0.845 0.768
Sigma P L(s,0) L/s(0) L(s,0) L/s(0)
0.00 1.4918 1.001 0.910 0.990 0.900
0.05 1.4918 1.003 0.912 0.985 0.895
0.10 1.4918 0.969 0.880 0.957 0.870
0.15 1.4918 0.925 0.841 0.917 0.834
0.20 1.4918 0.880 0.800 0.874 0.795
0.25 1.4918 0.834 0.759 0.830 0.755
0.30 1.4918 0.789 0.717 0.787 0.715
0.35 1.4918 0.744 0.676 0.743 0.675
Figure 4.7: The values of L and L/s corresponding Fig. 4.1 to Fig. 4.5.
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L(s,t)
s
1.60 1.0554 1.0455 1.0346 1.0224 0.0087 0.9933 0.9755 0.9550 0.9313 0.9048 0.8770
1.55 1.0475 1.0384 1.0282 1.0169 1.0042 0.9898 0.9732 0.9538 0.9309 0.9048 0.8770
1.50 1.0388 1.0304 1.0210 1.0106 0.9989 0.9857 0.9703 0.9522 0.9304 0.9047 0.8770
1.45 1.0291 1.0214 1.0128 1.0034 0.9927 0.9806 0.9666 0.9500 0.9297 0.9047 0.8770
1.40 1.0182 1.0112 1.0035 0.9950 0.9854 0.9746 0.9621 0.9471 0.9285 0.9046 0.8770
1.35 1.0061 0.9998 0.9930 0.9854 0.9769 0.9674 0.9564 0.9433 0.9267 0.9044 0.8770
1.30 0.9926 0.9870 0.9810 0.9743 0.9670 0.9587 0.9493 0.9382 0.9240 0.9040 0.8770
1.25 0.9775 0.9726 0.9674 0.9617 0.9554 0.9485 0.9407 0.9316 0.9202 0.9031 0.8770
1.20 0.9606 0.9565 0.9520 0.9471 0.9419 0.9363 0.9300 0.9231 0.9146 0.9015 0.8770
1.15 0.9418 0.9383 0.9345 0.9306 0.9263 0.9218 0.9171 0.9122 0.9067 0.8985 0.8770
1.10 0.9208 0.9179 0.9148 0.9116 0.9083 0.9049 0.9016 0.8984 0.8958 0.8930 0.8770
1.05 0.8973 0.8950 0.8925 0.8900 0.8875 0.8851 0.8829 0.8814 0.8812 0.8836 0.8770
1.00 0.8711 0.8692 0.8674 0.8655 0.8637 0.8621 0.8608 0.8605 0.8620 0.8686 0.8770
0.95 0.8417 0.8403 0.8389 0.8376 0.8363 0.8354 0.8349 0.8352 0.8375 0.8461 0.8770
0.90 0.8088 0.8078 0.8068 0.8059 0.8051 0.8046 0.8045 0.8053 0.8075 0.8150 0.8770
0.85 0.7719 0.7712 0.7705 0.7699 0.7695 0.7693 0.7695 0.7702 0.7717 0.7753 0.7650
0.80 0.7303 0.7299 0.7295 0.7292 0.7290 0.7289 0.7291 0.7297 0.7304 0.7286 0.7200
0.75 0.6834 0.6832 0.6831 0.6829 0.6828 0.6828 0.6830 0.6833 0.6834 0.6778 0.6750
0.70 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300
0.65 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850
0.60 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400
t 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
B(s,t)
s
1.60 0.5272 0.5391 0.5521 0.5666 0.5827 0.6007 0.6209 0.6435 0.6685 0.6953 0.7230
1.55 0.4833 0.4945 0.5068 0.5205 0.5358 0.5530 0.5723 0.5941 0.6186 0.6453 0.6730
1.50 0.4401 0.4506 0.4622 0.4751 0.4895 0.5057 0.5240 0.5450 0.5689 0.5953 0.6230
1.45 0.3979 0.4077 0.4184 0.4304 0.4439 0.4590 0.4763 0.4962 0.5192 0.5453 0.5730
1.40 0.3567 0.3657 0.3756 0.3867 0.3991 0.4131 0.4292 0.4478 0.4698 0.4953 0.5230
1.35 0.3165 0.3248 0.3339 0.3440 0.3553 0.3682 0.3829 0.4001 0.4206 0.4454 0.4730
1.30 0.2777 0.2851 0.2934 0.3025 0.3127 0.3243 0.3375 0.3531 0.3720 0.3955 0.4230
1.25 0.2402 0.2469 0.2543 0.2624 0.2715 0.2817 0.2934 0.3071 0.3240 0.3459 0.3730
1.20 0.2044 0.2103 0.2168 0.2239 0.2318 0.2407 0.2507 0.2625 0.2770 0.2965 0.3230
1.15 0.1704 0.1755 0.1811 0.1873 0.1940 0.2015 0.2099 0.2196 0.2315 0.2478 0.2730
1.10 0.1384 0.1428 0.1475 0.1527 0.1584 0.1646 0.1713 0.1789 0.1879 0.2003 0.2230
1.05 0.1087 0.1124 0.1163 0.1206 0.1252 0.1301 0.1353 0.1409 0.1469 0.1548 0.1730
1.00 0.0817 0.0847 0.0879 0.0913 0.0949 0.0986 0.1024 0.1061 0.1094 0.1125 0.1230
0.95 0.0576 0.0600 0.0625 0.0651 0.0678 0.0705 0.0731 0.0752 0.0763 0.0751 0.0730
0.90 0.0370 0.0387 0.0406 0.0425 0.0444 0.0463 0.0479 0.0488 0.0482 0.0442 0.0230
0.85 0.0202 0.0214 0.0227 0.0240 0.0253 0.0265 0.0273 0.0275 0.0261 0.0213 0.0000
0.80 0.0079 0.0087 0.0095 0.0103 0.0110 0.0117 0.0121 0.0119 0.0105 0.0068 0.0000
0.75 0.0009 0.0012 0.0016 0.0019 0.0023 0.0026 0.0027 0.0025 0.0017 0.0001 0.0000
0.70 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
t 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Terminating Default Game without Prepay Option              
Figure 4.8: Terminating default without prepay option. The lower shaded areas
represent the default regions.
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Terminating Default Game with Prepay Option for Borrower
L(s,t)
s
1.60 1.0000 0.9898 0.9792 0.9681 0.9566 0.9446 0.9322 0.9192 0.9313 0.9048 0.8770
1.55 0.9996 0.9902 0.9792 0.9681 0.9566 0.9446 0.9322 0.9443 0.9309 0.9048 0.8770
1.50 0.9976 0.9890 0.9794 0.9688 0.9566 0.9446 0.9322 0.9505 0.9304 0.9047 0.8770
1.45 0.9939 0.9861 0.9777 0.9681 0.9581 0.9446 0.9322 0.9498 0.9297 0.9047 0.8770
1.40 0.9884 0.9816 0.9742 0.9659 0.9574 0.9468 0.9387 0.9471 0.9285 0.9046 0.8770
1.35 0.9812 0.9752 0.9689 0.9618 0.9547 0.9465 0.9415 0.9433 0.9267 0.9044 0.8770
1.30 0.9720 0.9668 0.9614 0.9556 0.9498 0.9436 0.9406 0.9382 0.9240 0.9040 0.8770
1.25 0.9607 0.9563 0.9518 0.9471 0.9424 0.9380 0.9360 0.9316 0.9202 0.9031 0.8770
1.20 0.9471 0.9435 0.9398 0.9361 0.9325 0.9294 0.9277 0.9231 0.9146 0.9015 0.8770
1.15 0.9312 0.9283 0.9253 0.9224 0.9197 0.9175 0.9161 0.9122 0.9067 0.8985 0.8770
1.10 0.9126 0.9103 0.9080 0.9058 0.9038 0.9024 0.9012 0.8984 0.8958 0.8930 0.8770
1.05 0.8911 0.8893 0.8876 0.8860 0.8847 0.8837 0.8828 0.8814 0.8812 0.8836 0.8770
1.00 0.8665 0.8652 0.8639 0.8628 0.8619 0.8614 0.8608 0.8605 0.8620 0.8686 0.8770
0.95 0.8385 0.8375 0.8366 0.8359 0.8354 0.8350 0.8348 0.8352 0.8375 0.8461 0.8770
0.90 0.8066 0.8059 0.8053 0.8049 0.8046 0.8045 0.8045 0.8053 0.8075 0.8150 0.8770
0.85 0.7705 0.7700 0.7697 0.7694 0.7692 0.7692 0.7695 0.7702 0.7717 0.7753 0.7650
0.80 0.7295 0.7293 0.7291 0.7289 0.7289 0.7289 0.7291 0.7297 0.7304 0.7286 0.7200
0.75 0.6831 0.6830 0.6829 0.6828 0.6828 0.6828 0.6830 0.6833 0.6834 0.6778 0.6750
0.70 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300
0.65 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850
0.60 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400
t 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
B(s,t)
s
1.60 0.5600 0.5706 0.5817 0.5931 0.6051 0.6176 0.6305 0.6440 0.6685 0.6953 0.7230
1.55 0.5109 0.5207 0.5317 0.5431 0.5551 0.5676 0.5805 0.5942 0.6186 0.6453 0.6730
1.50 0.4632 0.4724 0.4824 0.4932 0.5051 0.5176 0.5305 0.5450 0.5689 0.5953 0.6230
1.45 0.4169 0.4254 0.4347 0.4447 0.4558 0.4676 0.4805 0.4962 0.5192 0.5453 0.5730
1.40 0.3722 0.3800 0.3885 0.3978 0.4080 0.4191 0.4316 0.4478 0.4698 0.4953 0.5230
1.35 0.3291 0.3362 0.3440 0.3525 0.3618 0.3722 0.3842 0.4001 0.4206 0.4454 0.4730
1.30 0.2876 0.2941 0.3011 0.3088 0.3173 0.3269 0.3382 0.3531 0.3720 0.3955 0.4230
1.25 0.2480 0.2538 0.2601 0.2670 0.2746 0.2833 0.2937 0.3071 0.3240 0.3459 0.3730
1.20 0.2104 0.2155 0.2210 0.2271 0.2339 0.2417 0.2509 0.2625 0.2770 0.2965 0.3230
1.15 0.1749 0.1793 0.1842 0.1895 0.1954 0.2021 0.2100 0.2196 0.2315 0.2478 0.2730
1.10 0.1417 0.1455 0.1497 0.1542 0.1592 0.1648 0.1713 0.1789 0.1879 0.2003 0.2230
1.05 0.1111 0.1143 0.1178 0.1215 0.1257 0.1302 0.1353 0.1409 0.1469 0.1548 0.1730
1.00 0.0833 0.0859 0.0888 0.0918 0.0951 0.0987 0.1024 0.1061 0.1094 0.1125 0.1230
0.95 0.0587 0.0608 0.0630 0.0654 0.0679 0.0705 0.0731 0.0752 0.0763 0.0751 0.0730
0.90 0.0377 0.0392 0.0409 0.0427 0.0445 0.0463 0.0479 0.0488 0.0482 0.0442 0.0230
0.85 0.0206 0.0217 0.0229 0.0241 0.0254 0.0265 0.0273 0.0275 0.0261 0.0213 0.0000
0.80 0.0082 0.0088 0.0096 0.0103 0.0111 0.0117 0.0121 0.0119 0.0105 0.0068 0.0000
0.75 0.0010 0.0013 0.0016 0.0020 0.0023 0.0026 0.0027 0.0025 0.0017 0.0001 0.0000
0.70 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
t 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Figure 4.9: Terminating default with prepay option. The lower shaded areas represent
the default regions and the upper shaded areas represent the prepay regions.
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Strategic default 
L(s,t)
s
1.60 1.0000 0.9898 0.9792 0.9681 0.9566 0.9446 0.9322 0.9192 0.9057 0.8917 0.8770
1.55 0.9985 0.9893 0.9792 0.9681 0.9566 0.9446 0.9322 0.9192 0.9057 0.8917 0.8770
1.50 0.9955 0.9871 0.9779 0.9679 0.9566 0.9446 0.9322 0.9192 0.9057 0.8917 0.8770
1.45 0.9909 0.9833 0.9750 0.9660 0.9559 0.9446 0.9322 0.9192 0.9057 0.8917 0.8770
1.40 0.9847 0.9779 0.9704 0.9624 0.9534 0.9434 0.9322 0.9192 0.9057 0.8917 0.8770
1.35 0.9766 0.9706 0.9640 0.9569 0.9491 0.9404 0.9306 0.9192 0.9057 0.8917 0.8770
1.30 0.9667 0.9615 0.9557 0.9495 0.9427 0.9353 0.9270 0.9175 0.9057 0.8917 0.8770
1.25 0.9548 0.9502 0.9453 0.9400 0.9342 0.9280 0.9212 0.9136 0.9044 0.8917 0.8770
1.20 0.9407 0.9368 0.9327 0.9282 0.9234 0.9183 0.9129 0.9071 0.9006 0.8916 0.8770
1.15 0.9243 0.9210 0.9176 0.9139 0.9100 0.9060 0.9019 0.8978 0.8938 0.8889 0.8770
1.10 0.9052 0.9026 0.8998 0.8969 0.8938 0.8908 0.8878 0.8853 0.8834 0.8826 0.8770
1.05 0.8834 0.8813 0.8791 0.8769 0.8746 0.8723 0.8704 0.8691 0.8690 0.8717 0.8770
1.00 0.8585 0.8569 0.8553 0.8536 0.8519 0.8504 0.8492 0.8488 0.8500 0.8549 0.8770
0.95 0.8301 0.8290 0.8279 0.8267 0.8256 0.8246 0.8240 0.8241 0.8258 0.8314 0.8550
0.90 0.7979 0.7972 0.7965 0.7958 0.7951 0.7946 0.7943 0.7946 0.7962 0.8008 0.8100
0.85 0.7614 0.7611 0.7608 0.7604 0.7601 0.7599 0.7598 0.7600 0.7609 0.7634 0.7650
0.80 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200 0.7200
0.75 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750 0.6750
0.70 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300
0.65 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850 0.5850
0.60 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400
t 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
B(s,t)
s
1.60 0.6009 0.6109 0.6214 0.6323 0.6437 0.6556 0.6680 0.6809 0.6944 0.7084 0.7230
1.55 0.5523 0.5614 0.5713 0.5823 0.5937 0.6056 0.6180 0.6309 0.6444 0.6584 0.6730
1.50 0.5052 0.5134 0.5225 0.5324 0.5436 0.5555 0.5680 0.5809 0.5944 0.6084 0.6230
1.45 0.4597 0.4671 0.4754 0.4843 0.4943 0.5055 0.5179 0.5309 0.5444 0.5584 0.5730
1.40 0.4158 0.4225 0.4299 0.4379 0.4468 0.4567 0.4679 0.4809 0.4943 0.5084 0.5230
1.35 0.3738 0.3797 0.3862 0.3933 0.4011 0.4098 0.4195 0.4309 0.4443 0.4584 0.4730
1.30 0.3336 0.3389 0.3445 0.3507 0.3574 0.3649 0.3731 0.3826 0.3943 0.4084 0.4230
1.25 0.2955 0.3000 0.3049 0.3102 0.3159 0.3221 0.3289 0.3365 0.3457 0.3584 0.3730
1.20 0.2596 0.2634 0.2676 0.2720 0.2767 0.2818 0.2872 0.2929 0.2995 0.3084 0.3230
1.15 0.2260 0.2292 0.2326 0.2363 0.2401 0.2441 0.2482 0.2522 0.2563 0.2612 0.2730
1.10 0.1950 0.1976 0.2004 0.2033 0.2063 0.2093 0.2123 0.2148 0.2166 0.2174 0.2230
1.05 0.1668 0.1689 0.1710 0.1733 0.1756 0.1778 0.1797 0.1810 0.1810 0.1783 0.1730
1.00 0.1417 0.1433 0.1449 0.1466 0.1482 0.1497 0.1509 0.1513 0.1501 0.1451 0.1230
0.95 0.1201 0.1212 0.1223 0.1234 0.1245 0.1255 0.1261 0.1260 0.1242 0.1187 0.0950
0.90 0.1023 0.1029 0.1036 0.1043 0.1050 0.1055 0.1058 0.1055 0.1039 0.0993 0.0900
0.85 0.0887 0.0890 0.0894 0.0897 0.0900 0.0902 0.0903 0.0900 0.0891 0.0866 0.0850
0.80 0.0802 0.0801 0.0801 0.0801 0.0801 0.0801 0.0801 0.0801 0.0800 0.0800 0.0800
0.75 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0750 0.0750 0.0750
0.70 0.0701 0.0701 0.0701 0.0701 0.0701 0.0701 0.0701 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700
0.65 0.0651 0.0651 0.0651 0.0651 0.0651 0.0651 0.0651 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650
0.60 0.0601 0.0601 0.0601 0.0601 0.0601 0.0601 0.0601 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600
t 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Figure 4.10: Strategic default game.
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Debt service payments:
*contractual payment (p*dt) = 0.1*0.01= 0.0010
s
1.60 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.8770
1.55 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.8770
1.50 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.8770
1.45 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.8770
1.40 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.8770
1.35 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.8770
1.30 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 0.8770
1.25 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 0.8770
1.20 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.8770
1.15 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.8770
1.10 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.8770
1.05 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.8770
1.00 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.8770
0.95 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.8550
0.90 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.8100
0.85 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.7650
0.80 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.7200
0.75 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.6750
0.70 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.6300
0.65 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.5850
0.60 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.5400
t 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Figure 4.11: Strategic payments by the borrower. Shaded areas represent the upper
and lower strategic default regions.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Through comparing the differences between a traditional mortgage market and the
sub-prime market with the involvement of securitization, we can observe that the
borrowers bargaining power has changed accordingly. Securitization has made the
borrowers more difficult to behave strategically when serving the debt. Through
strategic debt service modeling, we are able to prove that when the borrower is less
likely to behave strategically, the lender will respond and extend more credit over per
dollar of collateral. This is exactly what the banks were doing when making sub-prime
lending to potential homeowners. Our results suggest that aggressive lending is not
a predatory behavior, rather, it is a rational movement of the sub-prime lenders.
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Appendix
In this chapter, some matlab codes for the strategic default and terminating default
games are attached.
% This program determines the values of L(s,0) and B(s,0) in the
% Strategic default game using Crank-Nicolson
clear
%close all
clc
hold on
%Div
% Initialization
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Contract Parameters:
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
sig = 0.2;
r = 0.05;
T = 5;
S0=1.1;
%coupon flow
k=0;
p=0.1
k=k+1;
div_1= 0.1;
d_1=div_1;
ref_1 = 0.04; f_1=ref_1;
liq_1 = 0.1;
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l_1=liq_1;
cspread= 0.03;
c = r+cspread;
balt0 = exp(c*T) - (exp(c*T)-1)*(p/c); %Outstanding balance at Maturity T
P = balt0; %(Lump-sum payment)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Crank-Nicoson Parameters:
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Svec = [0:0.05:4]’;
tvec = [0:0.01:T]’;
N = length(tvec)-1;
M = length(Svec)-1;
j = 0:N; % j*dt = 0:T
i = 0:M;
dS = Svec(2)-Svec(1);
dt = tvec(2)-tvec(1);
L = zeros(M+1,N+1);B = L;
LEX =zeros(M+1,N+1);BEX = LEX;
LCUM = zeros(M+1,N+1);BCUM = LCUM;
b(j+1) = exp(c*j*dt) - (exp(c*j*dt)-1)*p/c;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Boundary Conditions
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
L(1,:) = 0; % L(s=0,t=0:T) = 0
L(M+1,:) = exp(c*j*dt) - (exp(c*j*dt)-1)*p/c ;
%L(:,N+1) = (Svec>=P)*P + (Svec<P).*max(0,Svec - l_1*Svec);
for i = 1:M+1
div(i) = Svec(i)*div_1*dt;
liq(i) = Svec(i)*liq_1;
sliq(i) = max(0,Svec(i) - liq(i));
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L(i,N+1) = min(sliq(i),balt0);
B(i,N+1) = Svec(i) - L(i,N+1);
end
%plot(L(:,N+1))
%pause(1)
B(1,:) = 0;
B(M+1,:) = Svec(end) - (exp(c*j*dt) - (exp(c*j*dt)-1)*p/c);
%B(:,N+1) = max(Svec-P,0);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Construct the matrix to solve the following linear system
% M1*U_{i-1} = M2*U_{i} + offset
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
i = 0:M;
alpha = (dt/4)*(sig*sig*(i.^2) - (r-d_1)*i) ;
beta = -(dt/2)*(sig*sig*(i.^2) + r);
gamma = (dt/4)*(sig*sig*(i.^2) + (r-d_1)*i);
% solution matrices
M1 = -diag(alpha(3:M),-1) + diag(1-beta(2:M)) - diag(gamma(2:M-1),1);
M2 = diag(alpha(3:M),-1) + diag(1+beta(2:M)) + diag(gamma(2:M-1),1);
[LL,UU] = lu(M1); % LU factorizations
% Loadings
offset_L = zeros(size(M2,2),1); % size(M2,2) gives the number of columns of M2 = M-1
%offset2_L =0*dt*ones(size(M2,2),1);
offset2_L =0*dt*ones(size(M2,2),1);%p = 0 in PDE
offset_B = zeros(size(M2,2),1); % size(M2,2) gives the number of columns of M2
offset2_B = offset_B;
for i = 1:M-1
%offset2_B(i) =dt*(dS*i*d_1 - p);
offset2_B(i) =dt*(dS*i*0 - 0); %p = 0 in PDE
end
%offset2_B=offset2_B(:);
for idx = N:-1:1 % time loop
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offset_B(1) = alpha(2)*(B(1,idx)+B(1,idx+1));
offset_B(end) = gamma(end)*(B(end,idx)+B(end,idx+1));
offset_L(1) = alpha(2)*(L(1,idx)+L(1,idx+1));
offset_L(end) = gamma(end)*(L(end,idx)+L(end,idx+1));
B(2:M,idx) = UU\(LL\(M2*B(2:M,idx+1) + offset_B + offset2_B));
L(2:M,idx) = UU\(LL\(M2*L(2:M,idx+1) + offset_L + offset2_L));
t = (idx-1)*dt;
balt(idx)= exp(c*t) - (exp(c*t)- 1)*(p/c);
ref= balt(idx)*(f_1+1); % Refinancing cost
vlex(:,idx) = L(:,idx);
vbex(:,idx) = B(:,idx);
for i = 1:M+1
%sliq(i) = Svec(i) - l_1*Svec(i);
vlliq = min(sliq(i),balt(idx));
vbliq = sliq(i) - vlliq;
vldlow = sliq(i);
vbdlow = 0;
%vldhi = balt(idx);
%vbdhi = sliq(i) - balt(idx);
vlprep = balt(idx);
vbprep = Svec(i) - ref;
critpay(i) = max(0,vlliq - L(i,idx));
conpay= p*dt;
stratpay(i) = min(conpay, critpay(i));
pay(i) = stratpay(i); % Strategic Game
%div(i) = (d_1*Svec(i))*dt;
vlcont = L(i,idx) + pay(i);
vbcont = B(i,idx) + div(i) - pay(i);
L(i,idx) = vlcont;
B(i,idx) = vbcont;
if vbcont <= vbdlow
B(i,idx) = vbdlow;
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L(i,idx) = vldlow;
end
if (vbdlow < vbcont)&(vbcont<vbprep)
B(i,idx) = vbprep;
L(i,idx) = vlprep;
end
stratpay(i,idx)=pay(i);
end
% B(end,idx) = B(end-1, idx);
% L(end,idx) = L(end-1, idx);
end
stratpay(1:end,N+1)=L(:,N+1);
for j = 501:-50:1
k=(j-1)/50+1;
sp(1:21,k) = stratpay(13:33,j);
ll(1:21,k) = L(13:33,j);
bb(1:21,k) = B(13:33,j);
end
% resort the results
[mm,nn] = size(sp);
temp = zeros(mm,nn);
for j=1:nn
for i=1:mm
temp(mm-i+1,j) = sp(i,j);
end
end
[mm,nn] = size(ll);
templl = zeros(mm,nn);
for j=1:nn
for i=1:mm
templl(mm-i+1,j) = ll(i,j);
end
end
[mm,nn] = size(bb);
tempbb = zeros(mm,nn);
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for j=1:nn
for i=1:mm
tempbb(mm-i+1,j) = bb(i,j);
end
end
%sp = temp;
% x=[];
% for i = 1:length(L(:,1))
%
% if L(i,1)-1>=0
%
% x=[i x];
% end
% end
%
% PL(k) = 1/Svec(min(x));
% ll(k)=L(23,1)
% bb(k)=B(23,1)
% %PL2(k) = S0/Svec(min(x))
% end
%
%
% %%%%%Plot the results%%%%%%%%
% Ratio = ll/S0;
% p=[0:0.02:.20];
% plot(p,Ratio,’ro-’)
% xlabel(’Coupon Payment’)
% ylabel(’L(S0,0)/S0’)
% grid on
% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%
% % for i = N+1:-10:1
% % plot(L(:,i))
% % pause(.2)
% % hold on
% % end
%
% legend(’Terminating Game(Securitization)’,’Strategic Game(Non-Securitization’)
%
% This program determines the values of L(s,0) and B(s,0) in the
% terminating default game using Crank-Nicolson
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clear
close all
clc
%hold on
%Div
% Initialization
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Contract Parameters:
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
sig = 0.2;
r = 0.05;
T = 5;
S0=1.1;
p=0.1;
%coupon flow
k=0;
div_1 = 0.1
k=k+1
d_1=div_1;
ref_1 = 0.04; f_1=ref_1;
liq_1 = 0.1;
l_1=liq_1;
cspread= 0.03
c = r+cspread;
balt0 = exp(c*T) - (exp(c*T)-1)*(p/c) %Outstanding balance at Maturity T
P = balt0; %(Lump-sum payment)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Crank-Nicoson Parameters:
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Svec = [0:0.05:4]’;
tvec = [0:0.01:T]’;
N = length(tvec)-1;
M = length(Svec)-1;
j = 0:N; % j*dt = 0:T
i = 0:M;
dS = Svec(2)-Svec(1);
dt = tvec(2)-tvec(1);
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L = zeros(M+1,N+1);B = L;
DB=B;DL=L;PB=B;PL=L;
LEX =zeros(M+1,N+1);BEX = LEX;
LCUM = zeros(M+1,N+1);BCUM = LCUM;
b(j+1) = exp(c*j*dt) - (exp(c*j*dt)-1)*p/c;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Boundary Conditions
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
L(1,:) = 0; % L(s=0,t=0:T) = 0
L(M+1,:) = exp(c*j*dt) - (exp(c*j*dt)-1)*p/c ;
L(:,N+1) = (Svec>=P)*P + (Svec<P).*max(0,Svec - l_1*Svec);
B(1,:) = 0;
B(M+1,:) = Svec(end) - (exp(c*j*dt) - (exp(c*j*dt)-1)*p/c);
B(:,N+1) = max(Svec-P,0);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Construct the matrix to solve the following linear system
% M1*U_{i-1} = M2*U_{i} + offset
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
alpha = (dt/4)*(sig*sig*(i.^2) - (r-d_1)*i) ;
beta = -(dt/2)*(sig*sig*(i.^2) + r);
gamma = (dt/4)*(sig*sig*(i.^2) + (r-d_1)*i);
% solution matrices
M1 = -diag(alpha(3:M),-1) + diag(1-beta(2:M)) - diag(gamma(2:M-1),1);
M2 = diag(alpha(3:M),-1) + diag(1+beta(2:M)) + diag(gamma(2:M-1),1);
[LL,UU] = lu(M1); % LU factorizations
% Loadings
offset_L = zeros(size(M2,2),1); % size(M2,2) gives the number of columns of M2 = M-1
%offset2_L =p*dt*ones(size(M2,2),1);
offset2_L =0*dt*ones(size(M2,2),1);%p = 0 in PDE
offset_B = zeros(size(M2,2),1); % size(M2,2) gives the number of columns of M2
offset2_B = offset_B;
for i = 1:M-1
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% offset2_B(jj) =dt*(dS*jj*d_1 - p);
offset2_B(i) =dt*(dS*i*0 - 0); %p = 0 in PDE
end
%offset2_B=offset2_B(:);
for idx = N:-1:1 % time loop
offset_B(1) = alpha(2)*(B(1,idx)+B(1,idx+1));
offset_B(end) = gamma(end)*(B(end,idx)+B(end,idx+1));
offset_L(1) = alpha(2)*(L(1,idx)+L(1,idx+1));
offset_L(end) = gamma(end)*(L(end,idx)+L(end,idx+1));
B(2:M,idx) = UU\(LL\(M2*B(2:M,idx+1) + offset_B + offset2_B));
L(2:M,idx) = UU\(LL\(M2*L(2:M,idx+1) + offset_L + offset2_L));
t = (idx-1)*dt;
balt(idx)= exp(c*t) - (exp(c*t)- 1)*(p/c);
ref= balt(idx)*(f_1+1); % Refinancing cost
vlex(:,idx) = L(:,idx);
vbex(:,idx) = B(:,idx);
for i = 2:M
sliq(i) = Svec(i) - l_1*Svec(i);
%vlliq = min(sliq(i) - balt(idx));
%vbliq = sliq(i) - vlliq;
vldlow = sliq(i);
vbdlow = 0;
%vldhi = balt(idx);
%vbdhi = sliq(i) - balt(idx);
vlprep = balt(idx);
vbprep = Svec(i) - ref;
% critpay(i) = max(0,vlliq - vl(i));
% stratpay(i) = min(conpay, critpay(i));
% Terminating Game pay(i) = p*dt
pay(i) = p*dt;
div(i) = (d_1*Svec(i))*dt;
vlcont = L(i,idx) + pay(i);
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vbcont = B(i,idx) + div(i) - pay(i);
L(i,idx) = vlcont;
B(i,idx) = vbcont;
if vbcont <= vbdlow
B(i,idx) = vbdlow;
L(i,idx) = vldlow;
DB(i,idx) = vbdlow;
DL(i,idx) = vldlow;
Dloc(i,idx) = i; % DefaultRegion
end
if (vbcont<= vbprep)
%display(’prepay’)
Ploc(i,idx) = i; % Prepay Region
B(i,idx) = vbprep;
L(i,idx) = vlprep;
PB(i,idx) = vbprep;
PL(i,idx) = vlprep;
end
end
%B(end,idx) = B(end-1, idx);
%L(end,idx) = L(end-1, idx);
end
for j = 501:-50:1
k=(j-1)/50+1;
ll(1:21,k) = L(13:33,j);
bb(1:21,k) = B(13:33,j);
dll(1:21,k) = DL(13:33,j);
dbb(1:21,k) = DB(13:33,j);
pll(1:21,k) = PL(13:33,j);
pbb(1:21,k) = PB(13:33,j);
end
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% resort the results
[mm,nn] = size(ll);
templl = zeros(mm,nn);
for j=1:nn
for i=1:mm
templl(mm-i+1,j) = ll(i,j);
end
end
[mm,nn] = size(bb);
tempbb = zeros(mm,nn);
for j=1:nn
for i=1:mm
tempbb(mm-i+1,j) = bb(i,j);
end
end
[mm,nn] = size(dbb);
for j=1:nn
for i=1:mm
tempdbb(mm-i+1,j) = dbb(i,j);
tempdll(mm-i+1,j) = dll(i,j);
temppbb(mm-i+1,j) = pbb(i,j);
temppll(mm-i+1,j) = pll(i,j);
end
end
%plot the default and prepay regions
%Default Region
[mm,nn] = size(Dloc)
for i =1:mm
for j=1:nn
if Dloc(i,j) ==0
Dloc(i,j) = NaN;
end
end
end
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for j =1:nn
Sc_d(j) = max(Dloc(:,j))*dS;
end
[mm,nn] = size(Ploc)
for i =1:mm
for j=1:nn
if Ploc(i,j) ==0
Ploc(i,j) = NaN;
end
end
end
for j =1:nn
Sc_p(j) = (min(Ploc(:,j))-1)*dS;
end
t= [0:0.01:4.99];
plot(t,Sc_d,’b’,’Linewidth’,2)
hold on
t2 =[0:0.01:3.57];
plot(t2,Sc_p,’k’,’Linewidth’,2)
grid on
xlabel(’\bf t’)
ylabel(’\bf s’)
title(’\bf Prepay Region and Default Region’)
legend(’Default Boundary’,’Prepay Boundary’)
%
% x=[];
% for i = 1:length(L(:,1))
%
% if L(i,1)-1>=0
%
% x=[i x];
% end
% end
%
% PL(k) = 1/Svec(min(x))
% ll(k)=L(23,1)
% bb(k)=B(23,1)
%PL2(k) = S0/Svec(min(x))
% %%%%%Plot the results%%%%%%%%
% Ratio_TER_DIV = ll/S0;
% div_1 = [0:0.02:0.14];
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% plot(div_1,Ratio_TER_DIV,’-’, ’Linewidth’,2)
% xlabel(’Dividend’)
% ylabel(’L(S0,0)/S0’)
% grid on
%
%
% figure
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%
% for i = N+1:-10:1
% plot(L(:,i))
% pause(.1)
% hold on
% end
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